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RECENT DECISIONS
Exclusionary Zoning Challenged-New Hope For The Eco-
nomically Deprived?-In the recent case of Southern Burling-
ton County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel,' the
Supreme Court of New Jersey imposed upon a developing sub-
urban community in New Jersey a set of guidelines by which
its zoning law was found invalid for failing to provide moderate
and low income housing. The decision is of concern not only to
other New Jersey communities, but also to the developing sub-
urbs of other jurisdictions. For this reason, this article will
examine the court's reasoning, ask some of the questions left
unanswered, and indicate how the Wisconsin Supreme Court
might resolve a similar case.
Mount Laurel is a sprawling township of approximately 22
square miles, or 14,000 acres, on the west central edge of Bur-
lington County. About ten miles from both Camden, New Jer-
sey, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, it is within relatively easy
commuting distance of both these metropolitan communities. 2
Its close proximity to these and other cities has caused the
population growth of Mount Laurel to increase in a way similar
to that of many other suburban communities.3 From a popula-
tion of 2,817 in 1950, to 5,249 residents in 1960, the growth of
the township reached 11,221 people in 1970.4 This growth was
comprised of people who were in the words of the court, "'out-
siders' from the nearby central cities and older suburbs or from
more distant places drawn here by reason of employment in the
region."5
Mount Laurel's local government responded to this growth
in a way that was typical of similarly developing suburbs. One-
third of the township's land was zoned industrial in an effort
to attract the favorable tax rateable from that source.' Little
1. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Mt. Laurel, and cited to
unofficial text.]
2. Mt. Laurel at 718.
3. Indeed, the court makes repeated references to Mount Laurel as a typical exam-
ple of suburban expansion. For a comparison, see Williams, Jr. and Norman,
Exclusionary Land Use Controls: The Case of North-Eastern New Jersey, 22 SY. L.
REV. 475 (1971).
4. Mr. Laurel at 718.
5. Id.
6. Favorable "tax rateables" bring in large revenues and require a minimum in
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more than one percent of the land was zoned for retail and
business activities. The remainder, almost seventy percent,
was zoned for residential purposes.7 The general ordinance for
this last area provided for four residential zones, all of which
permitted only single family detached dwellings in the usual
pattern of one house per lot. Of these residential zones, none
provided for a lot of less than 9,375 square feet, or a building
line width of the lot of less than 75 feet, or a floor space area of
less than 900 square feet.8 The only deviations from this general
pattern were a special zone created in 1968 to accommodate a
cluster zone development,9 a recent Planned Unit Development
that provided a few multi-family units in the form of medium
and high rise apartments and attached townhouses, and a se-
verely limited Planned Adult Retirement Community. These
exceptions did not noticeably alter the theme of the major
residential subzones.'0
public services whereas less desirable rateables provide less revenue and require more
in services.
7. The actual figures the court cites for these areas are as follows:
Industrial: 29.2% or 4,121 acres
Retail: 1.2% or 169 acres
Residential: 69.6% or about 10,000 acres
Id. at 718-19.
8. The exact figures for the residential sub-zones are as follows:
R-1 Min. lot area: 9,375 sq. ft.
Min. lot width: 75 ft. at building line.
Min. floor area: 1,100 sq. ft. for one-story house.
R-2 Min. lot area: 11,000 sq. ft.
Min. lot width: 75 ft. at building line.
Min. floor area: 900 sq. ft. for one-story house.
R-3 Min. lot area: 20,000 sq. ft.
Min. lot width: 100 ft. at building line.
Min. floor area: 1,100 sq. ft. for one-story house.
Id. at 719-20.
9. To define "cluster zone" the court quoted 2 WILLIAS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW:
LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER, §§ 47.01-47.05 (1974) as follows:
• . . Under the usual cluster-zone provisions, both the size and the width of
individual residential lots in a large (or medium-sized) development may be
reduced, provided (usually) that the overall density of the entire tract remains
constant-provided, that is, that an area equivalent to the total of the areas thus
"saved" from each individual lot is pooled and retained as common space.
Id. at 720.
10. These deviations alter neither the types of housing allowed on these lands nor
the types of persons for whom they are intended. The "cluster zone" still requires single
family, detached houses on lots of at least 10,000 square feet, with building line widths
of at least 80 feet, and an overall development density of 2.25 dwelling units per gross
acre. The PUD developments-only four were started before the enabling legislation
was repealed-are restricted by the number of bedrooms allowed each unit, the num-
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The inescapable conclusion that may be drawn from this
general plan of development was that the township sought only
high tax rateables which required the least expenditures for
municipal services-specifically, light industry and expensive
houses occupied by small families." The court noted that the
existent dwellings were such that only those of middle or high
income could afford to purchase a home in the township," and
that the possibility of renting an inexpensive home was se-
verely limited.' 3
Not only had Mount Laurel acted affirmatively through its
zoning ordinances to exclude those whom it felt undesireable,
but the township also attempted to expel its own lower income
residents. Generally, the official response to the resident poor,
usually living in substandard housing, was to wait for the de-
lapidated premises to be vacated and then forbid further
occupancy. 4
A single attempt by a non-governmental organization to
provide subsidized, multi-family housing for these groups was
effectively thwarted by the requirement that the project com-
ply with all zoning, planning and building ordinances.'"
Predominantly black and Hispanic, the plaintiffs fell into
four groups: (1) present residents of the township residing in
delapidated or substandard housing;'" (2) former residents who
were forced to move elsewhere because of the lack of housing
her of children permitted per multi-family unit, and the requirement that all units be
supplied with such amenities as central air conditioning. Lastly, the PARC is reserved
for those who are at least 52 years of age, have children above the age of 18, and will
require no more than three permanent residents per unit. Id. at 720-22.
11. The court states:
The conclusion is irresistible that Mount Laurel permits only such middle and
upper income housing as it believes will have sufficient taxable value to come
close to paying its own governmental way.
Id. at 730. Also, see Williams and Wacks, Segregation of Residential Areas Along
Economic Lines: Lionshead Lake Revisited, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 827, 829. •
12. The average cost of a house in the township in 1971 was approximately $32,000,
and the court speculated that by the time of the decision, this figure would have been
higher. Id. at 719.
13. As the court stated: "Attached townhouses, apartments (except on farms for
agricultural workers) and mobile homes are not allowed anywhere in the township
under the general ordinance." Id.
14. Id. at 722.
15. Because this project was to be built on land in a R-3 zone, single family,
detached houses on 20,000 square foot lots were required. Id.
16. For a graphic description of the substandard housing of some of these present
residents, see the lower court's opinion at 290 A.2d 465, 466-67 (1972).
1976]
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within their means; (3) non-residents living in the central city
substandard housing who desired decent housing within their
means in the township and generally elsewhere; and (4) three
organizations representing the housing and other interests of
racial minorities.17 The trial court found the township zoning
ordinance totally invalid and ordered the municipality to de-
termine the housing needs of low and moderate income families
who desired residence in the present or in the future. Further,
the township was directed to meet these needs with a new
zoning scheme, with the court retaining jurisdiction for judicial
consideration and approval of the plan and its implementa-
tion.1 8
After considering the particular circumstances presented by
the Mount Laurel zoning scheme itself, and giving careful con-
sideration to the social and economic ramifications of subur-
banization generally, the New Jersey Supreme Court arrived at
a conclusion similar to that of the lower court. In affirming the
invalidity of the ordinances, the court concluded:
As a developing municipality, Mount Laurel must, by its
land use regulations, make realistically possible the
opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of housing
for all categories of people who may desire to live there, of
course including those of low and moderate income. It must
permit multi-family housing, without bedroom or similar re-
strictions, as well as small dwellings on very small lots, low
cost housing of other types and, in general, high density zon-
ing, without artificial and unjustifiable minimum require-
ments as to lot size, building size and the like to meet the full
panoply of these needs. . . . The amount of land removed
from residential use by allocation to industrial and commer-
cial purposes must be reasonably related to the present and
future potential for such purposes. In other words, such mu-
nicipalities must zone primarily for the living welfare of peo-
ple and not for the benefit of the local tax rate. 9
Unlike the trial court, the supreme court did not find it neces-
17. Although the standing of these groups was not at issue here, the court noted
that the persons failling into the first three groups had the requisite standing. No
opinion was expressed as to the standing of the organizations. Mt. Laurel at 717, n. 3.
It is questionable, however, if all of these groups would have the requisite standing for
the United States Supreme Court in light of the recent decision of Warth v. Seldin,
- U.S. _ 95 S.Ct. 2197 (1975).
18. 290 A.2d 473-74.
19. Mt. Laurel at 731-32.
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sary to invalidate the entire zoning scheme. It did, however,
affirm the lower court's decision to allow the municipality
ninety days to bring the zoning ordinance within the newly set
parameters."0
If Mount Laurel's zoning scheme is viewed solely as a vexa-
tious example of exclusionary zoning, the policy position of the
decision presents few difficulties. Zoning, however, has been
and possibly should remain, an integral component of planned
development. Therefore, it is necessary to give careful consider-
ation to the factors by which this particular scheme was criti-
cized. Many of the important legal, social and economic con-
siderations supporting either side of this controversy must be
remembered and, ultimately, preserved.2 1
Since feudal times, the Anglo-American concept of land
ownership, in spite of common belief, has never been entirely
free of restraint upon its use. 22 While city planning was com-
mon place in the earliest settlements, the real impetus for mod-
ern American city planning, and the use of zoning laws to that
20. Id. at 734. Note that Justice Pashman, concurring with the result of the major-
ity opinion, differed in that he would have had the court go further and faster in the
implementation of the principles announced. Regarding the role of judicial supervi-
sion, he said:
The mere fact that local land use control issues are involved does not preclude
the court from making such determinations, nor, if a court finds that the munic-
ipality has failed to meet its obligation, from exercising the full panoply of
equitable powers to remedy the situation.
Id. at 746 (concurring opinion).
21. For example, see Village of Belle Terre v. Borras, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) wherein
Justice Douglas remarks:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted
are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs. This
goal is a permissible one within Berman v. Parker. The police power is not
confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay
out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion
and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.
22. Compare, for instance, Blackstone's comment:
So great, moreover, is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not
authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole
community.
1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 139 (1782), with An Act touching Iron-Mills near unto
the city of London and the River of Thames, 23 Euz., c. 5 (1581) which provided in
part:
That no person or persons from and after the feast-day of the nativity of Saint
John the Baptist next coming, shall convert or employ, or cause to be converted
or employed, to coal or other fewel for the making of iron or iron metal. . . any
manner of wood or underwood now growing. . . within the compass and pre-
cinct of two and twenty miles from and around the city of London.
Both are quoted in BEUSCHER, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS, 1-3 (1964).
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end, first developed after the turn of the twentieth century.3
The initial Supreme Court review of zoning was not until the
case of Amber Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, Ohio," wherein
the plaintiff challenged the validity of a local ordinance which
prohibited him from using all of his land for industrial pur-
poses. In spite of the plaintiffs contention that the use permit-
ted by the zone designation was a deprivation of property in
that it decreased the value of the land, the Court found the
ordinance was securely based within the power of the state to
promote the general welfare of the community.25 The Court
concluded it was the prerogative of the local legislature to de-
termine the validity of debatable zoning classifications, and
only under extreme circumstances would the courts intervene.
Euclid is important to Mount Laurel not only in that it
served as a constitutional validation of numerous zoning ordi-
nances,2 1 but also because of the way the concept of police
power was interpreted. In comparing the judicial attitude to-
ward zoning during the years separating these decisions,
several considerations are noteworthy. The first is what might
be called the deciding force creating the zoning regulation. In
Euclid, the Court determined that the local government was
the proper point for determining the desirability of a particular
zoning ordinance, a position which was recently reasserted. 2 In
this the Mount Laurel court concurred. Restrained in the ex-
23. The distinction between the early uses of planning and the modem approach
constitutes the objectives of each. In the former, it was the aesthetic considerations of
street and public building placement. In the latter, it is attempts to encompass all of
the functions necessary to the vitality of a city-transportation, housing, employment
areas, etc. New York was the first major city to enact geographically comprehensive
zoning laws. See, generally, R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, §§ 1.04-.08, 1.13
(1968).
24. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Earlier cases had considered the validity of municipal
ordinances that restricted the use of land on less than a wide scale plan, for example
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) and Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S.
171 (1915). However, Euclid has been recognized as the leading case in which a geo-
graphically comprehensive zoning ordinance is at issue.
25. 272 U.S. 365, 387.
26. ANDERSON, supra note 23 § 2.10.
27, In Belle Terre v. Borras, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), Justice Marshall, who dissented
from a majority opinion which upheld a zoning ordinance in spite of various, and in
his view controlling, constitutional arguments, nonetheless conceded:
I am in full agreement with the majority that zoning is a complex and important
function of the State. It may indeed be the most essential function performed
by local government, for it is one of the primary means by which we protect that
sometimes difficult to define concept of quality of life. 416 U.S. 1, 13.
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tent to which the majority wished to impose judicial supervi-
sion over the township, the court deferred the initial determi-
nation of the means of compliance to Mount Laurel itself.28
Second, the important consideration of whose general wel-
fare justified the exercise of the zoning power, emphasized in
Mount Laurel, was anticipated in the Euclid decision. The use
of zoning is commonly conceived of as a tool, (or to some, an
end in and of itself) by which a community may carry out a
pattern of development within its political boundaries. 9 Con-
comitant to this idea is the concept that the local municipal
government is the most logical basis for the exercise of this
power. To this end, enabling statutes are created to empower
these local governments," and tax structures are devised to
support this arrangement."1 Therefore, if only for this reason,
local governments were forced into a type of fiscal parochialism
for which zoning was used primarily as a means of protecting
their own economic and political interests. In Euclid, however,
the Court noted that although this was proper, parochialism
had its limits. While stressing the conclusion that the munici-
pality properly possessed the power to zone, and that the gen-
eral interests of its own citizens would be its primary concern,
the Court qualified this opinion:
It is not meant by this, however, to exclude the possibility of
28. Mt. Laurel at 734.
29. For a discussion of the relationship of zoning, theoretically the tool, to compre-
hensive planning, theoretically the goal, see R. BABcoCK, THE ZONING GAm, 120-25
(1969), wherein the author gives a good review of the ways in which the "zoning tail"
has been used to wag the "planning dog."
30. For example, the statute enabling Mount Laurel to zone, N.J.S.A. 40:55-30
reads:
Any municipality may by ordinance, limit and restrict to specified districts and
may regulate therein, buildings and structures according to their construction,
and the nature and extent of their use, and the nature and extent of the uses of
land, and the exercise of such authority, subject to the provisions of this article,
shall be deemed to be within the police power of the State. Such ordinances shall
be adopted by the governing body of such municipality, as herein provided,
except in cities having a board of public works, and in such cities shall be
adopted by such board.
The authority conferred by this article shall include the right to regulate and
restrict the height, number of stories, and sizes of buildings, and other struc-
tures, the percentage of lot that may be occupied, the sizes of yards, courts, and
other open spaces, the density of population, and the location and use and
extent of use of buildings and structures and land for trade, industry, residence,
or other purposes.
31. Mt. Laurel at 731.
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cases where the general public interest would so far outweigh
the interest of the municipality that the municipality would
not be allowed to stand in the way.3"
In spite of this language, the concept that the local government
could properly exercise the zoning power for the best interests
of its own citizens remained firm in both law and practice.
In Mount Laurel, the court denounced this ingrown applica-
tion of zoning power.33 The theme of the decision is a "broader
view of the general welfare and the presumptive obligation on
the part of developing municipalities, ,34 to be responsive not
only to the needs of the municipality itself, but also the re-
gional needs as they are manifested in the area. The court
begins its analysis by defining Mount Laurel as a portion of the
Philadelphia-Camden urban region, and sums up its position
by announcing an affirmative responsibility on the part of the
local government to zone with regional needs in mind. 5
In so doing, the court in Mount Laurel found it necessary
to re-evaluate the purpose of and extent to which the police
power may be utilized .3 The court began by reciting the ne-
cessity that all police power enactments conform to the basic
state constitutional requirements of substantive due process
and equal protection, and the affirmative requirement that
zoning, like any other police power enactment, promote the
public's health, safety and general welfare. Next, it noted that
even in decisions which upheld the validity of strict zoning
regulations, there had been the caveat that the judicial ap-
proach to the subject would and should change with social
conditions. Last, the court asserted that the situation had
changed and that a new approach was now needed.3 No longer
32. 272 U.S. at 391.
33. The court, in an emphatic moment, said:
Almost every [municipality] acts solely in its own selfish and parochial interest
and in effect builds a wall around itself to keep out those people or entities not
adding favorably to the tax base, despite the location of the municipality or the
demand for various kinds of housing.
Mt. Laurel at 723.
34. Id. at 728.
35. Id. at 731-32. Although the court defines the region for consideration as extend-
ing beyond state lines, the court did not impose interstate zoning. Id. at 733.
36. See also ANDERSON, supra note 23, §§ 7.12-7.36.
37. The court insisted that the decision made in this was pursuant to the New
Jersey constitution and statutes, and that it was unnecessary to consider the other
federal constitutional arguments urged by the plaintiff. Mt. Laurel at 725.
38. To find this new attitude, the court looks to several legislative enactments
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was zoning used as a tool by the municipality to shape its
development, but rather it was used as a means to preserve a
homogeneous single family residential community with just
enough industry and commerce to meet its fiscal needs.39 Thus,
the court concluded that the state police power could not be
used by a local government in such a way as to promote the
welfare of the group within its political boundaries while com-
pletely ignoring the needs of those outside the community."
The validity of a suburban community enacting a zoning
scheme to promote its fiscal interests, and preserve its particu-
lar aesthetic appeal, seems now to be in serious question. As
noted above, one of the strongest incentives for exclusionary
zoning is the fiscal benefit that can be cultivated by it. But the
Mount Laurel court did not find this argument at all compel-
ling. Accepting the concept that zoning is a means of creating
a better economic balance for the community when done rea-
sonably and pursuant to a plan for the community's develop-
ment, the court nonetheless concluded that this reason could
not be used to totally exclude categories of housing.4" Moreover,
though ecological and environmental considerations had pro-
perly become more important to those planning a community's
growth,4 2 they too would not necessarily justify exclusionary
concerned with the quantity and quality of housing in New Jersey, and to a sixteen
county study done by the state which pointed out a growing need for multi-family
housing in areas surrounding large cities. Id. at 727.
39. Indeed, so thorough was the zoning ordinance in its exclusionary effect that the
court was prompted to note:
One incongruous result is the picture of developing municipalities rendering it
impossible for lower paid employees of industries they have eagerly sought and
welcomed with open arms (and, in Mount Laurel's case, even some of its own
lower paid municipal employees) to live in the community where they work.
Id. at 723.
40. Id. at 726.
41. Id. at 731.
42. Actually, the environmental argument has always been significant as a basis
of zoning regulations, at least as between the use to which the land is put and the
inhabitants of that area. The new thrust, however, is more concerned with the relation-
ship between the use to which the land is put and the land itself.
The court used the term "environmental considerations" in a narrow sense to
indicate the destructive effects of pollution upon the delicate balance between living
things and land, water and air. But as a term of art used in its technical sense by
planners, environmental considerations take in the full panoply of relationships be-
tween natural resources and all of the demands man and other creatures place upon
them. In this way, the placement of lower income housing is as much an environmental
consideration as the capacity and effectiveness of a municipality's sewage treatment
plant. As one commentator noted: ". . . land use is a fundamental environmental
1976]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
zoning of this type. Here, the township forwarded an environ-
mental argument-lack of sewer or water utilities for much of
the area-which was quickly disposed of by the court with the
suggestion that these utilities be required of the builders and
developers as improvements. 3 The court did not dismiss envi-
ronmental considerations altogether but required only that the
adverse affect on the environment be substantial."
In putting the decision in its proper perspective, several
factual circumstances of Mount Laurel itself become impor-
tant. First, the court was primarily concerned with a zoning
scheme which had become economically discriminating. The
scheme had been adopted in 196415 when the township's popu-
lation was less than half of the present population.46 It may be
only fair to say, then, that the zoning provisions found exclu-
sionary in 1975 were enacted in 1964 in a reasonable attempt
to maintain a rural-suburban environment. But it seems clear
that this was not the sole purpose of the scheme as time went
on. The trial court made reference to the minutes of various
township committee meetings which indicated that the true
purpose by the time of the decision was the social and economic
discrimination of many of those supporting the scheme. 47 So
uniform was the discriminatory effect of this zoning scheme in
denying those of lower income access to the community that
this result alone would seem to have greatly aided the court in
reaching its decision.
Second, an important consideration in evaluating this deci-
sion is the fact that much of the township's land was not yet
improved. Of the five major zones-industrial, commercial, R-
issue-one that vitally affects transportation, housing, recreation, and even job oppor-
tunities." WiAm REILLY, THE USE OF LAND: A CITIZEN'S PoLacY GUIDE TO URBAN
GROWTH (1973) at 1.
43. The court, however, did not comment on the fact that by so doing, the cost of
constructing a home would be increased accordingly. Apparently, the cost of these
improvements is not insubstantial. See WILLIAMS and NORMAN, supra note 3 at 484.
44. Mt. Laurel at 731.
45. Id. at 718.
46. See text accompanying note 5.
47. 290 A.2d 468-69. The lower court, in summing up the particularly interesting
testimony of one witness, recalled:
He also conceded that he knew of no standard housing in defendant township
available for residents on welfare; that people are living in substandard housing
because the municipality will not condemn, in as much as our Relocation Law,
N.J.S.A. 20:4-1 to 22, would require that these residents be otherwise located.
The witness in this instance was a municipal planner.
[Vol. 59
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1, R-2 and R-3-the industrial and R-3 zones were still less
than half developed.48 This availability of land enabled the
court to assume that under proper management low income
housing could be built. 9 That land in the industrial zone was
thereby withdrawn from the residential land market, allowing
the township to control later residential development of the
area. It is conceivable, and indeed probable, that had the zon-
ing scheme continued the last remnants of the areas zoned for
residential purposes would have been completely built up be-
fore the industrial area, allowing the municipality to then re-
zone portions of that area for single family residential purposes.
Thus, the continued homogeneity of the township's residents
could be insured in the future.
Lastly, it will be necessary for the zoning authorities of
Mount Laurel, as well as many other suburban communities,
to give consideration to the important questions left unan-
swered by the court. For example, what effect will the affirma-
tive obligation now imposed upon developing suburbs have
upon established communities? The majority chose to limit its
inspection to those communities which, because of the avail-
ability of unimproved land, could more readily respond to the
'present and future housing needs of lower income groups." In
contrast, Justice Pashman, concurring, insisted that the obli-
gation also be assumed by those communities "which have
benefited from regional development, [and] have, by their
land use controls, contributed to the regional housing shor-
tages."'" In light of the dynamics which cause most communi-
ties to change, to require that developed communities provide
such needed housing at a moderate pace is not unreasonable.
If the obligation and the need exist, it would be possible to
legally enforce the obligation whenever reasonable opportuni-
ties arise. But drastic rezoning of such neighborhoods on a large
scale will lead only to the social and economic instability zon-
ing and planning were originally intended to avoid. The vested
interests of the current residents of these areas are not to be
ignored.52 Moreover, if the referendum remains an accepted
48. The industrial zone had been improved on only 100 of its 4,121 acres. Mt.
Laurel at 719-20.
49. Moreover, the only residentially zoned land available was also the most restric-
tive. See note 8, supra.
50. Mount Laurel at 717.
51. Id. at 748.
52. In addition to the position taken by the Belle Terre court (see note 21, supra),
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mode of public expression on local zoning matters, the practi-
cal availability of drastic measures is doubtful.53
Also, what impact will this decision have upon the power
of the local authorities to zone? Again, the majority opinion
gives this question only cursory consideration, and merely sug-
gests that proper planning and governmental cooperation may
prevent community instability. 4 The result is an obligation
upon local authorities to consider regional needs. Once more
Justice Pashman differs, finding that cooperation between the
localities which implement zoning and regional organizations
which can effectively plan the type of careful development re-
quired by the decision is an obligation concomitant to meeting
the regional needs of lower income groups.5 Therefore not only
must communities consider regional housing needs, but they
must also affirmatively participate in regional planning efforts.
To what extent either approach will undermine the traditional
concept of zoning and planning as a local responsibility and
perogative remains to be seen. Only the probability that such
efforts will be hotly contested by many groups and possibly
require major reallocations of this aspect of the police power
appear certain at this time."
Finally, what result might be expected from a similar case
decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court?57 Of all the ques-
new development in any suburban community generally imposes new fiscal burdens
upon its residents. Municipal services, including roads, sewers, schools and teachers,
are placed in greater demand by new residents who, if residents of apartments and
other multi-family units, cost more in the way of these services than they contribute
through taxes. See Note, The Responsibility of Local Zoning Ordinances to Nonresi-
dent Indigents, 23 STAN. L. REv. 774 (1971) at 776-77. .
53. The referendum is a method by which a governing body "lets the people de-
cide" proposed zoning changes involving large areas or controversial changes. For a
review of those cases which have upheld and rejected the referendum used in this way,
see Seeley, The Public Referendum and Minority Group Legislation: Postscript to
Reitman v. Mulkey, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 881 (1970). For a short discussion of its use in
Wisconsin, see R. CuTTER, ZONING LAW AND PRAcrIcE IN WISCONSIN (1967) at 33-35.
54. Mount Laurel at 733.
55. Id. at 744.
56. See Freilich and Ragsdale, Jr., Timing and Sequential Controls-The Essential
Basis to Effective Regional Planning: An Analysis of the New Directions for Land Use
Control in the Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Region, 58 MINN. L. REv. 1009
(1974), wherein the authors state at 1026: "The utilization of regional and state level
units for the exercise of zoning and planning power will necessitate a new delegation
or redelegation of the police power." Although Mount Laurel did not divest local
communities of their power to zone, the obligation to consider regional needs will no
doubt cause friction between the local community and planners, especially if the latter
are not at the local level.
57. Since the Mount Laurel decision, two similar cases have been decided by other
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tions raised by the Mount Laurel decision, this is probably the
most speculative. Neither is there a Wisconsin decision ad-
dressed to the same factual and legal issues involved in Mount
Laurel, nor is there a clear trend in Wisconsin zoning case law
generally. Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Town of
Habart v. Colliers invalidated a zoning ordinance which ex-
cluded all industry by imposing a single residential zone over
the entire community, an attempt to correlate exclusionary
zoning vis-a-vis industry with exclusionary zoning vis-a-vis
courts. In Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights,
517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975) the court was confronted with a situation involving the
construction of lower income multifamily dwellings in an essentially single family,
upper class neighborhood. The defenant had refused to rezone an area to allow the
construction on the grounds that the zoning ordinance required that such rezoning be
permitted only to allow a "buffer zone" between single family and non-residential
areas. This argument was rejected, and the court concluded that the rejection of the
desired rezoning had the effect of perpetrating residential segregation. The case is
important because after defining the defendant as a portion of the Chicago metropoli-
tan region, the court concluded that de facto residential segregation in the region
imposed an obligation on the community to provide relief by allowing construction of
a reasonable number of lower income housing units:
Because the village has so totally ignored its responsibilities in the past we are
faced with evaluating the effects of governmental action that has rejected the
only present hope of Arlington Heights making even a small contribution to-
wards eliminating the pervasive problem of segregated housing.
(517 F.2d at 415). Thus, the concept of approaching the problem of exclusionary zoning
in the suburb by evaluating the regional needs resulted in the imposition of zoning
considerations which went beyond the political boundaries of the suburban com-
munity.
Subsequently, in Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., -Pa. -,
341 A.2d 466 (1975), the question was again decided in favor of the builder of lower
income housing (Chesterdale). After a series of requests by Chesterdale to rezone a
particular 80 acre area for such construction, the township enacted a new zoning
ordinance which provided 80 acres to be developed for multi-family purposes. How-
ever, the 80 acres rezoned was not the same land desired by the builders. On appeal,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with Chesterdale that the new ordinance's
allocation of 80 acres, out of the 11,589 acres in the township, constituted "tokenism."
Citing an earlier case of National Land & Ir. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of A., 419 Pa.
504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965), for the proposition that a zoning ordinance whose primary
purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to avoid fiscal burdens may
not be held valid, and the Mount Laurel case for the proposition that a developing
community has the obligation to provide lower income housing at least to the extent
of the municipalities fair share of present and future regional needs, the court con-
cluded that the
. . . township zoning ordinance which provides for apartment construction in
only 80 acres out of a total of 11,589 acres in the township continues to be
"exclusionary" in that it does not provide for a fair share of the township acreage
for apartment construction.
(341 A.2d at 468). Again, regional needs become a factor in suburban zoning.
58. 3 Wis. 2d 182, 87 N.W.2d 868 (1957).
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lower income groups would be tenuous. Indeed, legal research-
ers are warned of such a comparison:
We do not construe the majority opinion as holding that a
zoning ordinance which zones an entire town or municipality
in a single-district-use-district is per se unconstitutional and
void. However we are fearful that it may be so construed in
the future."
This caveat is well taken, for although exclusionary zoning,
whatever its form, is still exclusionary zoning, the Collier deci-
sion was based more upon equitable considerations and the
application of a "reasonably adaptable" standard"0 than re-
gional needs and a broad construction of the term general wel-
fare.
But it is not meant by this to discourage attempts to make
such a comparison. In Collier, the ordinance was found invalid
primarily because it did not fulfill the objectives set forth in its
preamble. The Wisconsin zoning enabling statutes also set
forth objectives which such ordinances must strive to meet."
Because of the similarity of these statutes to those of New
Jersey, it is possible that the Wisconsin Supreme Court could
define the term "general welfare" in a regional context. Thus,
if sufficient emphasis is placed upon the need for a regional
59. Id. at 191.
60. The term "reasonably adapted" is used to denote the requirement that a zoning
ordinance conform to the reasonable uses to which the particular area may be put. As
the Collier court noted:
The municipaltiy must recognize the natural reasons and differences suggested
by necessity and circumstances existing in the area with which the ordinance
deals.
Id. at 189.
61. The authority to plan and zone is given to the County unit by Wis. STAT. § 59.47
(1973), which states as its purpose:
59.97 Planning and zoning authority. (1) PURPOSE. It is the purpose of this
section to promote the public health, safety, convenience and general welfare;
to encourage planned and orderly land use development; to protect property
values and the property tax base; to permit the careful planning and efficient
maintenance of highway systems; to insure adequate highway, utility, health,
educational and recreational facilities; to recognize the needs of agriculture,
forestry, industry and business in future growth; to encourage uses of land and
other natural resources which are in accordance with their character and adapt-
ability; to preserve wetlands; to conserve soil, water and forest resources; to
protect the beauty and amenities of landscape and man-made developments;
to provide healthy surroundings for family life; and to promote the efficient and
economical use of public funds.
The power to zone is given the city by Wis. STAT. § 62.23 (1973), including the power
to zone outside of city limits.
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approach to these problems, if the court would adopt the broad
view of general welfare, and if zoning laws were strictly held to
the obligation to meet the objectives of the enabling statutes,
a result similar to that of Mount Laurel could be reached."
The Mount Laurel decision is legally and morally laudable.
The original purpose of zoning, protection of the general wel-
fare, has been reasserted while the descriminatory aspects of
zoning have been rejected. Both the law and the city are con-
stantly growing and changing things, and because of this are
always in need of reconstruction and renewal to meet the needs
of those for whom they are intended to serve. Although there
are problems yet to be resolved, it is hoped that the new direc-
tion given to New Jersey zoning will inspire other jurisdictions
to reevaluate the goals of their ordinances in such a way as to
promote a heterogeneous environment which encourages the
economic and social welfare of the people living in their
growing metropolitan regions.
DAVID B. BILLING
62. Here, the emphasis has been upon the possible judicial response to exclusionary
zoning practices and the need for regional planning. However, there is already state
legislative recognition for regional, or non-local zoning and planning. For example, see
Wis. STAT. § 66.945 (1973) which provides for the establishment of regional planning
commissions, Wis. STAT. § 59.971 (1973) which requires restrictive zoning along shore-
lands of navigable waters and Wis. STAT. § 87.30 (1973) which requires restrictive
zoning of flood plain areas. The latter two also allow the state to act if the localities
do not.
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